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INTRODUCTION 
Svitlana Kravchenko was a person of dignity who believed in the 
dignity of humanity. Her efforts and labors over the past few decades 
were driven by her belief in the dignity of her fellow man and woman. 
She could literally feel the Godliness of people and their need to be 
treated as such. When I speak of dignity, the reader has a general idea 
of what I mean, and indeed, what Svitlana worked towards. 
Svitlana toiled in fields, touching peoples’ lives, and traveled 
across Ukraine, among other locales, to convince politicians, policy-
makers, and others to allow ordinary people–the poor, and the 
uninformed–to have open access to records and to learn about their 
environmental conditions; by supporting the Aarhus and Espoo 
Conventions, others too have fought and continue to fight on behalf of 
the downtrodden in courts. The battles to convince are hard-fought. 
Advocates of and for environmental rights, nay human rights, more 
often than not fight apathy and ignorance by policy-makers and 
judges who think or believe that they have better things to do than to 
do justice.1 Other policy-makers and judges are bolder than that and 
are often unencumbered by the veil of the status quo, which allows 
them to struggle with vexing problems. In the process, they always 
look forward beyond the mountains of obstacle in order to do justice. 
This Article focuses on just such a legal case, an adjudication, in 
the growing field of the environment and human rights: the human 
right to water. The case, Abdallah Abu Masad v. Water 
 
1 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007), a case where the United 
States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether carbon dioxide was a pollutant that 
could be regulated under the Clean Air Act. Id. at 532 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) 
(2011)). During that hearing, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia had the following colloquy 
with counsel for the State of Massachusetts: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Milkey, . . . I always thought an air pollutant was 
something different from a stratospheric pollutant, and your claim here is not that 
the pollution of what we normally call “air” is endangering health. That isn’t, that 
isn’t—your assertion is that after the pollutant leaves the air and goes up into the 
stratosphere it is contributing to global warming. 
MR. MILKEY: Respectfully, Your Honor, it is not the stratosphere. It’s the 
troposphere. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Troposphere, whatever. I told you before I’m not a scientist. 
. . . . 
JUSTICE SCALIA: That’s why I don’t want to have to deal with global warming, 
to tell you the truth. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–23, Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2006) (No. 
05-1120) (emphasis added). 
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Commissioner, is from the Israel Supreme Court, which found that 
under Israel’s Basic Law, its equivalent of a constitution, international 
human rights law, and Israeli statutory law, the right to dignity 
encompasses the right to water. Part I discusses and defines the 
concept of dignity in international law. Part II addresses dignity and 
Israel’s constitutional development. 
I 
THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY 
Dignity is akin to pornography,2 you know it when you see it. It is 
clear to most people when they are being treated with dignity or, in 
the alternative, when they or a fellow human being is not. 
Nevertheless, the law being what it is—a tool that requires exactness 
in word-smithing, i.e., specificity, or a specific definition—those who 
read “into” the text of a document, i.e., textualists,3 may abandon 
common sense while purportedly teasing out a word or a text’s 
original meaning.4 Being in the trenches and not in an ivory tower like 
appellate judges who are devoid of contact with those who suffer or 
are aggrieved, Professor Kravchenko and other rights activists did not 
have the luxury of philosophizing about the law or its meaning. 
For those who toil in the legal vineyards of despair, practicality is 
the order of the day. They must be lawyers and not legal philosophers. 
Indeed, some judges, whose efforts mirror those of lawyers who fight 
for justice, also grapple with doing justice and furthering the rights of 
the downtrodden. However, from my perspective, textualists use this 
interpretive tool to trample upon people’s rights in the name of the 
 
2 In a concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), regarding a claim 
by the State of Ohio about a purported pornographic film, “The Lovers,” Justice Potter 
Stewart asserted that, with regards to hardcore pornography, “I know it when I see it, and 
the motion picture involved in this case is not that.” Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
3 Textualism is “the interpretive approach that looks to the Constitution’s original 
public meaning . . . . As the name of the movement suggests, textualism’s search for 
original public meaning centers on the Constitution’s text.” William Michael Treanor, 
Against Textualism, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 983, 983 (2009). In the United States, one of the 
foremost adherents of textualism is Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). Other adherents include Scalia’s colleague, 
Justice Clarence Thomas, and Professor Steven Calabresi. 
4 See, e.g., Johnson Language, Textualism and Prescriptivism: A Conservative 
Relationship, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.economist.com 
/blogs/Johnson/2012/09/textualism-and-prescriptivism (describing/defining textualism as 
“a philosophy of legal interpretation concerned with remaining faithful to a text”). 
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“law”: their law. I discuss the issue of judges grappling to do justice 
below. However, I next discuss the concept of dignity in the law. 
II 
DIGNITY AND THE LAW 
One of the first incorporations or uses of the term “dignity” in a 
legal document was in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights (“UNDHR”),5 which was advocated for, and partially 
drafted by, former United States First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. The 
Declaration’s preamble sets the document’s tone with regards to 
human dignity, as follows: 
PREAMBLE 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .  
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter 
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and 
women and have determined to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom . . . .6 
Similarly, Article 1 of the Declaration provides that “[a]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”7 
In the field of international law, Myers McDougal, Harold 
Lasswell, and Lung-Chu Chen observed that employing dignity as the 
foundation for laws was an approach of “natural law.”8 The natural 
law9 approach, they argued, depends upon “exercises of faith.”10 They 
 
5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
6 Id. at Preamble (emphasis added). 
7 Id. at art. I (emphasis added). 
8 MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE 
BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 70 (1977). 
9 ‘Natural law theory’ is a label that has been applied to theories of ethics, theories of 
politics, theories of civil law, and theories of religious morality. . . . 
When we focus on the recipient of the natural law, that is, us human beings, the 
thesis of Aquinas’s natural law theory that comes to the fore is that the natural law 
constitutes the basic principles of practical rationality for human beings, and has 
this status by nature . . . . The notion that the natural law constitutes the basic 
principles of practical rationality implies, for Aquinas, both that the precepts of the 
natural law are universally binding by nature . . . and that the precepts of the natural  
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also observed that “[t]he abiding difficulty with the natural law 
approach is that its assumptions, intellectual procedures, and 
modalities of justification can be employed equally by the proponents 
of human dignity and the proponents of human indignity in support of 
diametrically opposed empirical specifications of rights.”11 Although 
these authors were or are American, it should be clear that under U.S. 
law there is no right “of” or “for” dignity. I posit that the Founding 
Fathers would have been appalled at such a circumstance.12 
A different view of dignity was expressed in a recent article in the 
U.K. newspaper The Guardian. The author asserted that “[e]veryone 
wants their dignity respected and protected. We understand this 
concept intuitively. But what does dignity mean for law and human 
rights?”13 
The article went on to state that dignity is an emerging 
jurisprudential notion in the United Kingdom, and it is also an adjunct 
to that country’s Human Rights Act of 1998 (“HRA”).14 This may 
well be correct; however, just as important is the fact that prior to the 
1998 adoption of the Human Rights Act, it was not possible in the 
courts of the United Kingdom to expressly challenge the existence 
and use of broadly framed measures by reference to the substantive 
European Convention on Human Rights15 (“ECHR”).16 The United 
Kingdom ratified the ECHR on November 1, 1993, when the Treaty 
 
law are universally knowable by nature. The precepts of the natural law are binding 
by nature: no beings could share our human nature yet fail to be bound by the 
precepts of the natural law. This is so because these precepts direct us toward the 
good as such and various particular goods. 
Mark Murphy, The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu /entries /natural-law     
-ethics. See also Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171 (2008). 
10 MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 69. 
11 Id. at 70. 
12 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
13 Catherine Dupré, What Does Dignity Mean in a Legal Context?, THE GUARDIAN, 
(Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/mar/24 
/dignity-uk-europe-human-rights. 
14 Human Rights Act 1998, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.). 
15 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
16 The treaty is formally known as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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on European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty)17 came into 
force. “As such, it [now] sits in the wider human rights landscape of 
the European convention on human rights (ECHR) brought into UK 
law through the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998.”18 
III 
DIGNITY AND ISRAEL’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The example of the United Kingdom is employed here because 
Israel adopted a good deal of British mandatory law at its inception as 
a state in 1948. Much of that law is still utilized by the State, 
including a number of “emergency laws” that allow the military to 
administratively detain a person, without charge, for a term of years.19 
Like the United Kingdom, Israel came somewhat late to human 
rights. Similarly, the ECHR also had a profound effect on Israeli 
law.20 Israel’s constitutional revolution began with the passage, by the 
Knesset (Israel’s Parliament), of the Basic Law21 in 1992.22 The Basic 
 
17 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 4, 
Dec. 29, 2006, O.J. C 321 E/37; The History of the European Union, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2013). 
18 Dupré, supra note 13. The Maasticht Treaty or European Union entered into force in 
1993: 
 Courts in England and Wales have so far protected a number of facets of human 
dignity, such as disabled patients’ right to be lifted in an appropriate manner by 
their careers; homosexuals’ right to equal treatment in tenancy agreements; or 
asylum seekers’ right to receive asylum support and to be protected against 
destitution while their claim is being considered. This case law paints a sorry 
picture of how some of the most vulnerable members of society are treated when 
their need for support is at its greatest. Reliance on dignity has highlighted their 
vulnerability and imposed a positive duty to treat everyone in a human way that 
does not degrade or ignore their identity. 
Id. 
19 See generally Shiri Krebs, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Judicial Review of 
Administrative Detentions in the Israeli Supreme Court, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 639, 
660 (2012). 
20 See, e.g., Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, 
May 3, 2002 (signed at Vilnius, Lithuania) (“Convinced that everyone’s right to life is a 
basic value in a democratic society and that the abolition of the death penalty is essential 
for the protection of this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all 
human beings.”) (emphasis added), available at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en 
/Treaties/Html/187.htm. 
21 State of Israel, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, (Mar. 17, 1992), published in 
Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 1391 of the 20th Adar Bet, 5752 (Mar. 25, 1992); the Bill and 
Explanatory Note were published in Hatza’ot Chok, No. 2086 of 5752, at 60, available at  
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Law contains a number of provisions that are very similar to the 
ECHR, particularly with regards to the right to dignity. It did not take 
long after the Law’s enactment for the judiciary to be called upon to 
interpret it. Israel’s Supreme Court initiated the country’s 
constitutional revolution when it handed down its judgment in the 
case of United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village,23 
which is Israel’s Marbury v. Madison.24 
 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. The law was amended in 1994 
as follows: 
Basic principles 
1. Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of 
the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are 
free; these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the 
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. 
Amended Mar. 9, 1994. Amended law published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 1454 of the 
27th Adar 5754 (Mar. 10, 1994), at 90; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in 
Hatza’ot Chok No. 2250 of 5754, at 289. 
22 For the history of the Basic Law, see generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS 
JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(2004). See also Leslie Friedman Goldstein, From Democracy to Juristocracy, 38 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 611, 624 (2004), which provides in pertinent part: 
In Israel, which entrenched certain rights by adopting a Basic Law in 1992, the 
hegemonic elite was the group of Ashkenazi Jews, of European and/or North 
American descent, who were typically affluent, secular Zionists and dominated 
political office and cultural institutions. They wanted Israel to be democratic and 
Jewish (in the ethnic sense) and favored Enlightenment values. The challenging 
groups were (1) the Jews of North African and Middle Eastern (Mizrahi) and 
Ethiopian descent, who were often religiously Orthodox; (2) the ultra-Orthodox, 
who have very large families and are often poor; (3) the Arab Israelis (20% of the 
population by 2002); and (4) the largely poor and nonreligious million or so recent 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union / Russia. These “disadvantaged 
minorities” grew in both population and political clout during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Suddenly, in 1992, after years of opposition to an entrenched bill of rights, the 
politically dominant but soon to be nondominant Ashkenazi changed their tune. 
The Basic Law does not say explicitly that Israel’s Supreme Court has the power to 
throw out legislation, but that court had exercised such activist administrative 
review and aggressive legislative “interpretation” (altering apparent meanings of 
laws in order to have them conform to certain principles such as equality before the 
law) long before the advent of a written bill of rights . . . that its use of the new list 
of rights and liberties in the Basic Law to rescind legislation was quite predictable. 
Incidentally, as with the European examples, the Israeli Basic Law strikes an 
American as remarkably easy to amend (it takes only a majority of the total 
Knesset), but the practice seems to be that entrenched provisions do not later get 
altered. 
23 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221 [1995] 
(Isr.). 
24 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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As part of the constitutional transformation fostered by United 
Mizrahi, the Supreme Court, sitting as The High Court of Justice, or a 
constitutional court, established a regime for judicial review, 
constructional corrective justice, and an expansion of human rights 
and freedoms. However, as Daphna Barak-Erez, an Israeli 
constitutional law expert who was recently appointed to the Supreme 
Court, has noted: 
Criticism of the Israeli Supreme Court intensified due to changes 
that occurred during the 1990s, following the enactment of two new 
Basic Laws regarding the protection of human rights—Basic Law: 
Freedom of Occupation, and Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty. These Basic Laws specified a list of human rights which 
were granted constitutional protection against infringing legislation, 
and therefore threatened the omnipotence of the legislature.25 
Table I below lists the provisions of the Basic Law. Note that 
sections two and four address the concept of dignity. Section two, 
entitled “Preservation of Life, Body and Dignity,” states that “There 
shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person as such 
. . .” while section four, “Protection of Life, Body and Dignity,” 
provides that “[a]ll persons are entitled to protection of their life, body 
and dignity.” 
IV 
DIGNITY AND THE RIGHT FOR WATER 
In 1992, Professor Stephen McCaffrey authored a seminal article 
proposing a human right to water.26 Since then, his efforts fostered a 
stream of scholarship—by such well-recognized scholars as Edith 
Brown Weiss and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, among many 
others27—affirming his proposed entitlement. Indeed, McCaffrey’s 
and other scholars’ urging for a human right to water, via their 
scholarship, most likely caused the United Nations’ Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to author Social and Cultural 
 
25 Daphna Barak-Erez, Law in Society: A Unifying Power or a Source of Conflict?, in 
LAW AND SOCIOLOGY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES VOL. 8 165 (Michael Freeman ed., 2006). 
26 Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International 
Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1992). 
27 EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
(2005). See also Itzchak Kornfeld, A Global Water Apartheid: From Revelation to 
Resolution, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 701 (2010); Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Human 
Right to Water: An Ethical Position or a Realizable Goal?, in RECONCILING HUMAN 
EXISTENCE WITH ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY 183 (Laura Westra et al. eds., 2008); Peter 
Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487 (1999). 
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Rights General Comment No. 15, The Right to Water (pursuant to 
articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights).28 
Today, the existence of a human right to water is seldom 
challenged.29 Nevertheless, few states have adopted either General 
Comment No. 15 or other legal regimes that seek to afford the human 
right to water. However, in the recent case of Abu Masad v. Water 
Commissioner,30 the Israeli Supreme Court found that under both the 
laws of the State of Israel and human rights law, there exists a basic 
human right for water. In Abu Masad, Justice Ayala Procaccia, 
writing for a unanimous court, initially noted that the Respondents 
Water Commissioner and the Israel Lands Administration “do not 
deny the right of the Appellants to water as part of their basic rights to 
live in dignity.”31 Following an extensive survey of the literature, 
decisions in other countries, and human rights law, the Justice held 
that in this case, brought by Bedouin residents who reside in 
unrecognized villages in southern Israel’s Negev Desert, the right for 
water is a basic right deserving of protections under Israel’s Basic 
Law’s “right to live in dignity”32 as well as its water law and 
international human rights law. 
V 
ABU MASAD V. WATER COMMISSIONER 
A. Facts of the Case 
This case came to the Court as an appeal by six Bedouin plaintiffs 
from a decision of the district court in Haifa sitting as the Water 
Tribunal. Justice Procaccia framed the issue before the High Court as 
raising: 
 
28 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive 
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). 
29 But cf. Kornfeld, supra note 26. 
30 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad v. Water Comm’r [2011] (Isr.). The opinion was 
authored in Hebrew. However, there is English translation, available at 
http://adalah.org/upfiles/2012/Supreme%20Court%20Ruling,%20Civil%20Appeal%20No.
%209535.06%20-%20Abu%20Masad,%20Right%20to%20Water%20-%20English.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2013). 
31 Id. ¶ 12. 
32 Id. ¶ 19. 
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[T]he question of the extent to which Bedouins living in various 
illegal places of settlement in the Negev have a legal right to 
demand that the State install private connection points to water in 
their homes in their illegal place of residence, while in current 
circumstances they are provided water through two alternative 
supply systems: first, through water centers adjacent to permanent 
settlements, where water can be purchased and independently 
transported to their place of residence; second, by applying to the 
allocations committee for drinking water, which is authorized to 
recommend the connection of unrecognized village residents to 
private water connections through specific requests, and following 
special humanitarian considerations.33 
The court below rejected Petitioners’ request to overturn the 
decision of the Water Commissioner to not provide them and their 
families34 “with private connections to water in their illegal places of 
settlement.”35 Indeed, Justice Procaccia explains in the High Court’s 
decision that the issue of these illegal places of settlement is a 
complex one. She notes that the settlements are both unorganized and 
unrecognized and were “built without plans, and without any of the 
legally required adaptations to the regulations of [Israel’s] Planning 
and Construction Law.”36 
Moreover, in a line of cases regarding the illegal settlements, the 
Court observed that there exist: 
[I]ssues of trespassing on government or privately-owned land. This 
type of settlement raises many substantial difficulties in various 
spheres, including the provision of vital services to the residents of 
those villages. The government’s general policy, and its 
 
33 Id. ¶ 1. I quote the entirety of the Court’s framing of the issue for two reasons. First, 
to provide the reader with Justice Procaccia’s exact wording, as I believe that it conveys 
how she sees the question before the Court, and second, because I am concerned that in 
paraphrasing, I will unintentionally leave out an important element. 
34 Id. ¶ 3 (“Each of the Appellants submitted a request on his behalf and on behalf of 
several additional families, so that, in fact, each request was submitted by several dozen 
people, all Bedouin citizens . . . .”). 
35 Id. ¶ 2. The issue of the illegality of the Bedouin settlements is a thorny one in Israel. 
Since the Bedouins are aboriginal residents of the Negev and Sinai Deserts, who have 
inhabited these areas as pastoralists for at least a millennium, they consider the land that 
they live on their own. However, the Government of Israel, which adopted the British 
colonial geography, asserts that it—the government—owns all of the land in Israel, unless 
a person has a bona fide deed. However, that is not the end of the issue. If a non-Jew, i.e., 
a Bedouin who is Muslim, claims land even via a deed, the courts may not honor the 
document. Moreover, like most aboriginal people, e.g., American Indians or Canadian 
First Peoples, Bedouins generally do not have deeds evidencing ownership of the land that 
they inhabit. These are peoples who have lived in these areas for hundreds of years prior to 
the arrival of Europeans. 
36 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 5 [2011] (Isr.). 
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implications for the Bedouin community in the Negev, is a 
widespread and complicated question with many ramifications.37 
But that policy and the Bedouins have been described as follows: 
 The Bedouins are an indigenous people, most of whom 
internally displaced from lands they had owned for centuries. From 
the 1950s on the Bedouins were dispossessed from their land by 
means of laws passed by the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset), the 
Israeli legal system and varied administrative measures. Today the 
190,000 Bedouins living in the Negev are the most disadvantaged 
citizens in Israel and are struggling for their rights of land 
ownership, equality, recognition, and the pursuit of their distinctive 
way of life. About 60% of the Bedouin citizens live in seven failing 
government-planned towns. The remainder 40% live in dozens of 
villages that are not recognized by the government as well as in 
several new recognized townships. These Israeli citizens do not 
receive basic services, such as running water, electricity, roads, 
proper education, health and welfare services. In addition, they live 
under the continuous threat of home demolition, crop destruction 
and further displacement.38 
B. Lack of Access to Water: The Problem 
The Bedouins who live in these unrecognized villages reside in one 
of three structures: large tents, tents attached to tin structures, or 
structures built with cinder blocks and other materials, such as tin or 
wood.39 Most of these structures have no connection to electricity or 
water. With regards to the lack of access to household water 
connections, the Bedouins in these makeshift and unrecognized 
communities are required to obtain water in one of two ways. First, 
they can purchase water from a “water center,” which may be located 
near a “legal” village, and transport it back to their homes, utilizing 
whatever means are available to them.40  However, these centers often 
 
37 Id. 
38 Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, The Bedouin-Arabs in the Negev-
Naqab Desert in Israel: Response to the Report of the State of Israel on Implementing the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) 1 (Aug. 2009), available at 
http://ccprcentre.org/doc/HRC/Israel/NegevCoexistenceForumResponse%20to%20State%
20Report.pdf (The “shadow report relates to the periodic report submitted by the State of 
Israel [CCPR/C/ISR/3] on July 25th, 2008 regarding implementation of the Charter for 
Civil and Political Rights.”) (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
39 Personal observations by the author over the past five years. 
40 Sharmila L. Murthy et al., The Human Right to Water in Israel: A Case Study of the 
Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev 2 (Jan. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs  
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times are situated many miles from home.41 Moreover, they are 
generally nothing more than a large diameter pipe separated into 
smaller diameter pipes.42 The pipes are generally individually 
connected to a water meter. Each meter supplies potable water that is 
either used by a family or a clan, i.e., it may supply up to a few 
hundred people.43 
On the other hand, these Bedouins can seek authorization from the 
Israel Water Authority and the Israel Land Administration, the 
administrative bodies that have jurisdiction for granting “the 
connection of individuals in illegal settlements to private water 
connection points.”44 The procedure for the approval of what is 
termed “a private water connection” necessitates the submission of a 
request to the “Committee for Allocating Drinking Water” (“Water 
Committee”).45 The Water Committee is a special body that acts in 
response to humanitarian concerns with regards to the Bedouin sector 
in Israel.46 
Following the submission of such a request, the Water Committee 
considers the need for and prospect of providing extraordinary 
authorization for a private water connection to the Bedouins who 
reside in what are termed “illegal settlements.” Subsequent to such an 
analysis, the Water Committee presents its recommendation to the 
Authority for Water and Sewage, the body that, under Israel’s Water 
Law,47 authorizes these types of connections.48 Private water 
connections are not household connections. Rather, they are offshoots 
from a main pipeline that are extended to the nearest road adjacent to 
a residence or settlement.49 See Figure 1. The Water Authority reasons 
that it only “runs” the pipe to the nearest road because often times the 
Bedouin settlements can be kilometers away from it, and the expense 
 
/centers/carr/programs/RightToWater/HumanRight2WaterIsrael_SMurthy_MWilliams_E
Baskin.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 4 [2011] (Isr.). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. Water Law, 1959, art. 1 (Isr.). Article 1 of the Law provides that “[t]he water 
sources in Israel are the property of the public. They are controlled by the State and are 
intended to fulfill the needs of the population and the development of the country.” 
49 Murthy et al., supra note 40, at 3. 
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would be too great.50 From the road, these pipes are subdivided so 
that they provide access to several families. Normally, one person—
generally a male, possibly the head of a hamula51 or clan—is in 
charge of collecting water bill payments, which are then transferred to 
the government.52 
The Water Authority pays for the pipe to the access point, e.g., 
from the main pipe to the nearest roadway. The Bedouins, however, 
are responsible for the costs of the materials and related supplies 
required in order to transport the water from the main pipe to 
individual residences.53 Since the private access points are generally 
situated near roadways, the pipes, which may stretch a number of 
kilometers overland, are open to the elements and therefore to 
potential damage and may result in lowered water pressure. 
Consequently, nearly all of the Bedouin settlements possess tanks or 
storage vessels adjacent to their residences. See Figure 2. 
C. The Legal Issues 
In the Abu Masad case, the appellants sought to have additional 
“private” water connections installed near their unrecognized villages. 
The Court noted that previously the association of the unrecognized 
villages in the Negev Desert to potable water sources was deliberated 
in a previous High Court of Justice case: HCJ 3586/01 The Regional 
Council for Unrecognized Villages v. the Minister of National 
Infrastructure.54 In that case, the Court concluded that the most 
appropriate way for the Bedouin residents in the unrecognized 
villages to verify their rights to have their dwellings linked to public 
water was for groups of at least ten families to tender a specific 
request to the Water Committee, which is authorized to recommend 
private water connections to the Director of the Authority. The Court 
 
50 It is unclear why the Authority does not extend the pipe to the Bedouins’ residence. 
51 “The hamula, a traditional kinship social structure, plays an important part in the 
internal affairs of the Arab.” Maha T. El-Taji, Arab Local Authorities in Israel: Hamulas, 
Nationalism and Dilemmas of Social Change 1 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Washington) (on file with the University of Washington Suzzalo and Allen 
Library), available at http://lib.haifa.ac.il/electronictexts/1435124.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 
2013). 
52 Murthy et al., supra note 40, at 3. 
53 “In most instances, the ‘pipe’ [that extends from the road] is a 1” flexible black 
[polyvinyl chloride] pipe that snakes across the ground, and in some instances, is buried 
underground.” Id. See infra Figure 1. 
54 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad, v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 6 [2011] (Isr.). 
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provided another remedy, should this procedure be inadequate to meet 
their needs. They were granted the right to appeal the decisions of the 
Director of the State Authority to the qualified court.”55 
Thus, following the decision in Regional Council for Unrecognized 
Villages, the appellants presented their requests to the Water 
Authority for authorization to connect their residences to roadside 
water pipes.56 The Court notes that “[r]epresentatives of the Water 
Committee discussed the appellants’ requests, and even visited their 
areas of settlement, in an attempt to examine their conditions and the 
specific need, if it exists, to connect the residents’ homes to private 
water points.”57 Thereafter, the Committee determined that they 
would present the Director of the Authority with the following 
recommendation: reject five of the appellants’ requests for a private 
connection and recommend the connection of one of the appellants.58 
The Director of the Authority adopted the recommendations of the 
Water Committee.59 Subsequently, the appellants submitted an appeal 
to the Water Tribunal to be heard by the Director of the Authority. 
Their appeal was based on the provisions of the Water Law.60 The 
Water Tribunal upheld the Director’s decision and an appeal was 
lodged in the High Court. 
D. The Proceedings Before the High Court of Justice 
In the appellants’ appeal before the Supreme Court, the Water 
Authority did not contest its duty to provide water to the Bedouins in 
an amount “required for their existence”61 and “as part of their basic 
rights to live in dignity . . . .”62 Nevertheless, the Authority, which 
operates in accordance with the Israeli Water Code,63 argued that it is 
only authorized to provide household water connections to legally 
constructed buildings, i.e., for people who have acquired the requisite 
 
55 Id. 
56 Id. ¶ 7. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 8 [2011] (Isr.). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. ¶ 40 (“The foremost principles of the authority’s policy in this case are: there is 
no dispute on the obligation to enable the Bedouin community access to water resources 
required for their existence.”). 
62 Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis added). 
63 Water Code of 1966 (Isr.), available at http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/about-reshut 
-hamaim/Pages/Legislation.aspx. 
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building permits under Israeli law. Indeed, the Court noted that these 
“illegal settlements . . . contradict the planning laws and the 
government’s policy”64 which seek to relocate these Bedouins to 
existing municipalities where the gamut of urban services, including 
water and sewage services, are provided. 
However, Justice Procaccia also observed that “[a]pproximately 
half of the Bedouin community lives in permanent settlements, 
established over the years by the governments of Israel, as part of a 
general plan designed for this purpose. The other half of the Bedouin 
community [which numbers anywhere from 75,000–100,000 people] 
lives in illegal locations, also referred to as ‘unrecognized villages.’”65 
Consequently, if a Bedouin family moves to a township, that family 
will “receive full connection to water infrastructure, and to other vital 
services that the state provides to those living within [its boundaries 
by] the law, such as electricity[ ] and other municipal services.”66 
Indeed, the Court declared that “[t]he decisions of the Director of 
the Authority in this case must be examined both according to the 
general policy of the authority in regard to the provision of water to 
unrecognized Bedouin settlements and in relation to individual 
decisions that were reached in the case of the Appellants.”67 As part 
of that examination the Court noted that it needed to determine how 
the type of access and manner of delivery of water to the Bedouin 
residents “is affected, inter alia, by the need to adapt the forms of 
settlement to the legal requirements stated in planning and building 
laws and according to government policy.”68 Furthermore, Justice 
Procaccia observed that so long as these illegal settlements continue 
to flourish, and as an intermediate step until such time as a 
comprehensive solution is found for Bedouin settlement, the 
Authority functions on two separate paths, so as “to ensure that the 
Bedouins have access to water sources.”69 
These two tracks include: (1) establishing water centers, from 
which the Bedouins who reside in unrecognized settlements can move 
water to their settlements or homes; and (2) granting individual 
 
64  CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 12 [2011] (Isr.). 
65 Id. ¶ 5. 
66 Id. ¶ 12. 
67 Id. ¶ 40. 
68 Id. 
69 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad, v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 40 [2011] (Isr.). 
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permits for “private water connections in specific cases, according to 
the recommendation of the water committee and based on 
humanitarian considerations.”70 As a result of these two tracks, Justice 
Procaccia asserted that the Court was required to contend with an 
initial issue: whether the Bedouin settlements’ illegality, and in turn 
the government of Israel’s (“GOI”) policy to resolve this 
phenomenon, by offering authorized permanent settlements, should 
be regarded as relevant concerns in ruling on the appellants’ 
individual submissions to the Water Authority for private water 
connections; or whether these considerations are perhaps superfluous, 
thereby requiring the Court to ignore them.71 
Justice Procaccia answered the above question in the affirmative: 
“the element of illegal settlement, the need to deal with this 
phenomenon and the existence of available alternatives—legal 
settlement—are relevant considerations that can be, and must be, 
taken into account when examining a request for a private connection 
to a water source.”72 The Justice’s conclusion, and therefore the 
Court’s ruling on this issue, was that in formulating a test for a 
person’s degree of accessibility to government provided water 
sources, i.e. whether a resident lives in an illegal settlement, “is a 
relevant consideration which may be taken into account.”73 
Nevertheless, the Court found that the Basic Law, as well as 
Israel’s ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) requires that the GOI is 
obligated to provide water to the appellants’ settlements. As part of its 
analysis in the question of whether the Water Authority and the Lands 
Administration are legally obligated to provide private connections to 
the appellants, the Court concluded that there are four alternatives74 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. ¶ 41. 
72 Id. ¶ 42. (“The illegal settlements of the Bedouin throughout the Negev have become 
a leading national problem, whose implications are widespread in all areas of life. It 
constitutes a phenomenon that greatly harms the laws of planning and construction and the 
protection of property; it is a case of ‘a group of people making a law unto themselves,’ 
and choosing, at their own discretion, when and how to settle, with total disregard to state 
laws, including basic planning regulations.”). 
73 Id. ¶ 41. 
74 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad, v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 19 [2011] (Isr.). Although 
the Court stated that “[t]here exist three levels in the normative recognition of a person’s 
right to water,” it addressed three constitutional grounds and one treaty right, per the 
ICESCR. 
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“in the normative recognition of a person’s right to water.”75 Since the 
focus of this paper is constitutional law, only the three normative 
constitutional grounds are addressed here. They are as follows: 
[1] [T]he right to water on the level of a regular law, both by virtue 
of a statutory arrangement and by virtue of customary law; [2] the 
constitutional right to water, derived from another recognized 
constitutional right, by virtue of [Article 2 of] the Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty—in our case, the right to live in 
dignity; and finally, [3] at the top of the pyramid, the legislative 
right to water that is recognized by virtue of itself. This 
constitutional right for water is recognized in different countries, 
particularly in those that suffer from a severe shortage of water.”76 
Justice Procaccia began her analysis of Israel’s constitutional 
scheme by noting that “Israel recognizes the right to water first and 
foremost as a statutory right by virtue of the Water Law.”77 
Nonetheless, she noted that an independent constitutional right to 
water was not granted prior to this case by virtue of the country’s 
Basic Law. But “water is vital to the very existence of a person, and 
to his existence with dignity . . . .”78 Accordingly, in her view, the 
Court had to consider “whether the right to water was granted the 
normative status of a constitutional right, deriving from the 
constitutional right to life with dignity; and whether, by extension, the 
State is obligated to provide any person living in Israel with water to 
the extent needed for minimal existence with dignity.”79 
E. The Constitutional Right for Water 
The basic right to human dignity is the foundation of the right to a 
dignified existence, “given recognition as a constitutional right in 
constitutional law in Israel.” The Court cited Section 4 of the Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and quoted its text as follows: “[a]ll 
persons are entitled to protection of their life, body and dignity,” and 
section 2 of the Basic Law provides that: ‘“There shall be no violation 
of the life, body or dignity of any person as such.’”80 Indeed, Justice 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. ¶ 20. 
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad, v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 20 [2011] (Isr.) (emphasis 
added). 
80 Id. 
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Procaccia observed that the right to dignity lies therefore, in the basic 
law, both in the positive and negatives aspects thereof . . . .”81 
The Court went on to observe the following: 
[T]he idea that the dignity of a person [is undeniably] a 
constitutional right [that] also includes the right of a minimum of 
human existence, such as a roof over one’s head, basic food, and 
basic medical care, and that the state is obligated to ensure that a 
person’s level of existence does not go below a minimum required 
for living with dignity has put down deep roots in the Israeli legal 
system.82 
Moreover, Justice Procaccia observed that a line of the Court’s cases 
has held that human dignity means living “without being subdued by 
distress and encountering unbearable depravity. This is an approach, 
by which the right to dignity is the right that a person be ensured the 
minimum of material means to exist within the society in which he 
lives.”83 Indeed, the Court noted that human dignity is a multifaceted 
notion that assimilates numerous and diverse values, which include 
physical and mental-spiritual features.84 
The injury to human dignity may well be characterized by both 
psychological humiliation and physical deprivation and might be 
articulated in the abjuration of basic physical-existential requirements 
without which a human being might not exist with dignity. Moreover, 
the Court cited the following examples: “[t]ake from a person the roof 
over his head, his food, his water, and his basic medical treatment and 
you have taken his ability to exist with dignity, and to realize his 
existence as a human being.”85 Consequently, the essential 
significance of the human right to a minimal subsistence is that the 
need to realize this right in severe situations may lead to a situation 
where the constitutional duty to guarantee a person’s most basic 
rights, including the right to water, develops into a State obligation. In 
this fashion “the nature of the right to minimal existence with dignity” 
 
81 Id. ¶ 21. (citing Barak, J., in HCJ 366/03, Commitment for Peace and Soc. Justice 
Soc’y v. Minister of Fin., § 11 (Isr.) (unpublished opinion, Dec. 12, 2005); Aharon Barak, 
Prologue, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 7 (Yoram Rabin & 
Yuval Shani, eds., 2004) (in Hebrew)). 
82 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting AdminA 3829/04 Twito v. the Municipality of 
Jerusalem 59(4) PD 769, 779 [2004] (Isr.)). 
83 Id. (quoting HCJ 366/03 Commitment for Peace and Soc. Justice Soc’y v. Minister of 
Fin., § 15; Aharon Barak, Human Rights as a Legislative Right, 41 HAPRAKLIT 271, 280 
(1994) (in Hebrew)). 
84 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad, v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 22 [2011] (Isr.). 
85 Id. 
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is distinctive; it may impress on the State the positive duty to ensure 
the fulfillment of this right, as distinguished from other legislative 
rights, typified “by the upholding of a prohibition on the State to harm 
the rights of an individual to realize them himself . . . .”86 
Justice Procaccia also found that “[a]ccessibility to water sources 
for basic human use falls within the realm of the right to minimal 
existence with dignity. Water is a vital need for humans, and without 
basic accessibility to water of a reasonable quality, humans cannot 
exist.”87 She went on to note that from a constitutional analysis, one 
must therefore deem “the right to water as a right to human existence 
with dignity,”88 which is accorded constitutional safeguards because it 
is part and parcel of the constitutional right to human dignity, which 
is secured in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.89 
F. The Court Finds that Even the Right to Water Has Limits 
Nevertheless, the Court observed that no constitutional right is 
absolute.90 Consequently, the right to water is a right which has 
relative protections and must be balanced in each case against other 
rights, some of which may possess contradictory values.91 Indeed, 
Justice Procaccia observed that “[t]here might be competing interests 
of another person or of society at large,” which could ostensibly run 
counter to the right to water.92 Accordingly, the requirement “for 
water under given concrete circumstances is a vital and existential 
need”93 when balancing competing interests. As a result, the Court 
asserted, the right for water acquires more weight, and therefore, the 
competing values must yield.94 
Alternatively, “insofar as the right to water is realized in its basic 
form, as part of the right for minimal existence with dignity, and the 
stated demand is for its realization in a more comfortable and 
accessible manner,”95 other competing interests might become more 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. ¶ 23. 
88 Id. 
89 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad, v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 23 [2011] (Isr.). 
90 Id. ¶ 24. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad, v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 24 [2011] (Isr.). 
95 Id. 
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important and override that right. Indeed, the foregoing principles 
also speak to what the Court termed the “reasonableness and 
proportionality of decisions”96 carried out by a competent 
governmental department with respect to making potable water 
accessible either to individuals or settlements, when assessed on an 
administrative level. The Court’s “balancing” is counter to what it 
held earlier in its judgment: the human right to water is absolute.97 It 
is illogical and ignores the very foundation of human rights law. 
When the Court states that “[t]here shall be no violation of the life, 
body or dignity of any person as such,”98 does it mean that there can 
truly be no violation of the life and body? For if this is what Justice 
Procaccia meant, that right to water is absolute. There can be no 
wavering from it. Similarly, the Court observed that indeed: 
[T]he idea that the dignity of a person as a constitutional right also 
includes the right of a minimum of human existence, such as a roof 
over one’s head, basic food, and basic medical care, and that the 
state is obligated to ensure that a person’s level of existence does 
not go below a minimum required for living with dignity has put 
down deep roots in the Israeli legal system.99 
The foregoing paragraph similarly supports the view that the right to 
water is, and must be, absolute.100 Finally, in conducting its balancing 
act, the Court fell into what numerous human rights courts, 
particularly the European Court of Human Rights, have done, straying 
from what ought to be an absolute right to a relative one.101 
 
96 Id. 
97 See supra note 83 (the right to water is “a right to human existence with dignity”). 
98 Id. ¶ 21 (quoting Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty § 2, 5754-1994, SH No. 
1454 p. 90 (Isr.), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm). 
99 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad, v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 21 [2011] (Isr.) (quoting 
AdminA 3829/04 Twito v. the Municipality of Jerusalem 59(4) PD 769, 779 [2004] (Isr.)). 
100 See generally Krebs, supra note 19, at 670–71. See also Theodor Meron, On a 
Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (1986) (discussing the 
“balancing [of] one human right that has assumed the status of jus cogens against another 
human right that has not gained such exalted status . . . .”). 
101 With regards to the problems created in balancing by the European Court of Human 
Rights, I am indebted to, and must acknowledge, a personal communication from 
Professor Samantha Besson, Chair of Public International Law and European Law, and 
Co-Director of the European Law Institute, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, on 
October 16, 2012. Telephone interview with Samantha Besson, Chair of Public 
International Law and European Law, Co-Director of the European Law Institute, 
University of Fribourg, Switzerland (Oct. 16, 2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
In Abu Masad the Supreme Court of Israel held that under Israel’s 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, water of reasonable quality 
is a critical requirement for people and without it humans cannot 
exist. The Court also held that in order to live in dignity, there must 
be a legal right for water.102 Indeed, Justice Procaccia, writing for the 
Court, held that the right for water falls under the specified list of 
human rights which are granted constitutional protections against 
infringing legislation. She went on to note that from a constitutional 
analysis, one must therefore deem “the right to water as a right to 
human existence with dignity.”103 Nevertheless, the Court held that 
the right is not absolute, which strikes this author as somewhat 
oxymoronic. In one sense, I believe that the Court was hamstrung by 
the fact that it has approved the GOI’s characterization of the lands 
that these Bedouin live on as illegal. However, in this case the Court 
had the opportunity to state emphatically that whatever the GOI’s 
view of the land that someone lives on, legal or illegal, the Bedouin 
population must be supplied the basic necessities of life, without 
exception. Thus, the right for water trumps the finding by the 
government of the status of the land one resides upon. As it turns out, 
the Court remanded the case to the Water Court, which recently found 
that the petitioners have no right of piping water, and the case has 
once again been appealed to the Supreme Court. 
  
 
102 CA 9535/06 Abdallah Abu Masad, v. Water Comm’r, ¶ 23 [2011] (Isr.). 
103 Id. 
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TABLE 
ISRAEL’S BASIC LAW: HUMAN DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, 5752-1992, 
1391 LSI 150 (1991-1992) (ISR). 
§ 1. Purpose 1. The purpose of this Basic Law 
is to protect human dignity and 
liberty, in order to establish in a 
Basic Law the values of the State 
of Israel as a Jewish and 
democratic state. 
 
§ 2. Preservation of life, body 
and dignity 
 
2. There shall be no violation of 
the life, body or dignity of any 
person as such. 
 
§ 3. Protection of property 3. There shall be no violation of 
the property of a person. 
 
§ 4. Protection of life, body and 
dignity 
4. All persons are entitled to 
protection of their life, body and 
dignity. 
 
§ 5. Personal liberty 5. There shall be no deprivation or 
restriction of the liberty of a 
person by imprisonment, arrest, 
extradition or otherwise. 
 
§ 6. Leaving and entering Israel 6. (a) All persons are free to leave 
Israel. 
(b) Every Israel national has the 
right of entry into Israel from 
abroad. 
 
§ 7. Privacy 7. (a) All persons have the right to 
privacy and to intimacy. 
(b) There shall be no entry into the 
private premises of a person who 
has not consented thereto. 
(c) No search shall be conducted 
on the private premises of a 
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person, nor in the body or personal 
effects. 
(d) There shall be no violation of 
the confidentiality of conversation, 
or of the writings or records of a 
person. 
 
§ 8. Violation of rights 8. There shall be no violation of 
rights under this Basic Law except 
by a law befitting the values of the 
State of Israel, enacted for a 
proper purpose, and to an extent 
no greater than is required. 
 
§ 9. Reservation regarding 
security forces 
9. There shall be no restriction of 
rights under this Basic Law held 
by persons serving in the Israel 
Defence Forces, the Israel Police, 
the Prisons Service and other 
security organizations of the State, 
nor shall such rights be subject to 
conditions, except by virtue of a 
law, or by regulation enacted by 
virtue of a law, and to an extent no 
greater than is required by the 
nature and character of the service. 
 
§ 10. Validity of laws 10. This Basic Law shall not affect 
the validity of any law (din) in 
force prior to the commencement 
of the Basic Law. 
 
§ 11. Application 11. All governmental authorities 
are bound to respect the rights 
under this Basic Law. 
 
§ 12. Stability 12. This Basic Law cannot be 
varied, suspended or made subject 
to conditions by emergency 
regulations; notwithstanding, 
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when a state of emergency exists, 
by virtue of a declaration under 
section 9 of the Law and 
Administration Ordinance, 5708-
1948, emergency regulations may 
be enacted by virtue of said 
section to deny or restrict rights 
under this Basic Law, provided the 
denial or restriction shall be for a 
proper purpose and for a period 
and extent no greater than is 
required. 
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